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I was asked by the editor of Re!ective Practice to pen an essay commenting 
on Jacques Ellul’s classic book, The Technological Society, originally published 
as La Technique in 1954.1 The concern of the editor was with how Ellul’s ar-
gument holds up nearly 57 years later. There is one slight misnomer in the 
“re-visited” title that I give to this essay. In point of fact—and in retrospect, 
a little surprising to me—I did not read The Technological Society when I was 
doing my doctoral studies in sociology in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s—
despite the fact that the English edition carried an introduction by the dis-
tinguished sociologist, Robert K. Merton. Various of Ellul’s ideas rattled 
around some of my sociological classes at that time but, for some reason, 
I never picked up on his work. I was more taken at that time by two other, 
somewhat cognate and more hopeful books about technology and modern 
life: Lewis Mumford’s Techniques and Civilization2 and Ivan Illich’s Tools for 
Conviviality.3
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After !nishing my doctorate in sociology, I did a post-doctoral year in 
theological ethics at the University of Chicago. Gibson Winter, who taught 
there at the time, was a great fan of Ellul (and, behind Ellul, the in"uence 
of Heidegger). Ellul is a bit hard to type, academically. He was profoundly 
in"uenced by Karl Barth and was self-consciously a Christian, albeit an ec-
umenical one. Many of his books are best-termed theological. Technically, 
his position at the University of Bordeaux, where he served as a professor, 
was in philosophy. Yet in The Technological Society, Ellul eschews any explicit 
theological stance. He describes himself in that book as engaging primarily 
in sociological re"ection. Perhaps, one apt way to describe the book is to say 
it is a dazzling phenomenology of the technical state of mind. Yet, in truth, I 
only just got around to reading The Technological Society.
To the question of how does Ellul’s argument stand up, I have one 
short answer—despite many changes in the last !fty years (surprisingly, El-
lul did foresee the information explosion and something like an Internet, as 
well as biotechnology), Ellul is not particularly dated because of new devel-
opments. Again as a summary judgment, any "aws in Ellul’s argument (I 
will suggest one glaring one) as we read him now were there equally sixty 
years ago. As it turns out, reading Ellul today !ts closely with a current in-
tellectual project of mine: How to relate moral thinking with sociological 
structures and the new forms of a networked society?
For those who have not read The Technological Society, it is an enor-
mously learned and, in places, densely written book and it has a clear and, 
on the face of it, compelling argument. By technique, Ellul did not mean just 
machines. Rather, as his translator put it: “Technique is the totality of meth-
ods rationally arrived at and having absolute ef!ciency.” Another way of 
looking at technique is to see it as the ensemble of practices by which one 
uses available resources to achieve values. Ellul seems to refer to technique 
as the entire pre-determined complex of standardization of means. For El-
lul, technique applies not just to the economy or the state, but to leisure ac-
tivities, bodily regimes, regulations, psychoanalysis, management and or-
ganization, human technique, information, and etc. “Nothing at all escapes 
technique today.”4
The Technological Society is, in no way, an optimistic book. It is an al-
most harrowing inspection of the rise of modern technological society since 
the industrial revolution, which allows little lee-way for effective agency to 
control its excesses. It is a book that is almost deterministic and, even, fatal-
istic. In part, Ellul states that he “deliberately refrained from providing solu-
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tions,” even though lurking throughout the book is the question of how to 
resist and transcend technological determinisms. To be sure, in his introduc-
tion,5 Ellul does admit that he believes in human agency, but “the individu-
al’s acts or ideas do not here and now exert any in"uence on social, political, 
economic mechanisms.” There has been an “application of technique to all 
spheres of life.” So, “at present, there is no counterbalance to technique.”6
In earlier societies, before the industrial revolution, there were built-in 
limitations to techniques. Techniques remained local and were constrained 
by what may now be called “the inef!ciencies,” which are caused by deep-
rooted loyalties to family, religion, culture, public opinion, and a prevailing 
morality. But once capitalism arose in its industrial forms, technique came to 
spread from economy to society to all spheres of modern life. The technical 
mind, Ellul argues, has a built-in totalitarian tendency toward centralizing 
varying sub-sections of technique. The precise role of the centralized, plan-
ning state is to integrate technique. Technique also shows an anti-democrat-
ic tendency, in that it “always gives rise to an aristocracy of technicians who 
guard secrets to which no outsider has access.”7
The rise of “economic man” devalued all activities and tendencies oth-
er than the economic. The technical mind tends to think of technique as neu-
tral and it eschews moral judgments. The technical mind “tends to create 
a completely technical morality.”8 A technological take-over of society in-
verts means to ends. The most important questions become merely “how-
to” technical questions—for example, the creation of the atom bomb and bi-
ological experiments that exalt arti!cial forms of procreation. Ellul laments 
that “technological man” tends to move, inexorably and without much deep 
thought, from what is technically possible to its actuation. Those who resist 
the technological mind become isolated or rejected.
The brilliance of the book lies in the way Ellul systematically treats 
technique and the economy, the state, and the law (where order and secu-
rity get substituted for justice as the end and foundation of law—such that 
“law becomes merely a complex of technical norms.”9 Technique de-natures 
natural society and various techniques converge. Human techniques, such 
as propaganda, advertising, and other psychological means, attempt to get 
humans to do what they do not spontaneously want to do. Education is re-
duced to an attempt to produce technicians. Ellul ends up calling this techni-
cal world “a universal concentration camp.”10
Some commentators have mused about what Ellul would do with the 
elements of a full-blown information revolution. At least some of them sug-
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gest that he could include them in his analysis. Media applications that use 
the Internet, such as Facebook, Twitter, and iPods, and the way they are elec-
tronically inter-twined would not surprise him. He would also note that—
as entertainment—it is simply not the case that “the individual, left on his 
own, will devote himself to the education of his personality or to a spiritual 
and cultural life.”11 Moreover, he would likely lift up the ‘unintended con-
sequences’ of information technology: for example, its tendency to make si-
lence or quiet meditation more dif!cult.
One citation captures well the basic thrust of the book:
The character of technique renders it independent of man himself. Man, 
practically speaking, no longer possesses any means of bringing action to 
bear upon technique. He is unable to limit or orient it. The reality is that 
man no longer has any means with which to subjugate technique, which 
is not an intellectual, or even, as some would have it, a spiritual phenom-
enon. It is above all a sociological phenomenon, and in order to cure or 
change it, one would have to oppose to it checks and barriers of a socio-
logical character. By such means alone man might possibly bring action 
to bear on it. But everything of a sociological character has had its char-
acter changed by technique. There is, therefore, nothing of a sociological 
character available to restrain technique, because everything in society is 
its servant. Technique is essentially independent of the human being who 
!nds himself naked and disarmed before it.12
No one, then, so brilliantly unmasks the technological mind and its 
ability to lure us into a kind of blind acceptance and complacency in its as-
cendancy as Ellul does. No one so well details the idea that technology is not 
neutral or that, while made to serve humans, it actually subverts that hierar-
chy, so that humans serve it—no one so well helps us see that technology is 
rarely neutral in its effects. Ellul is effective in showing the folly of trying to 
address technological spheres as totally separate (they are inter-twined, as 
state is with economy, and labor is with leisure time). He does us a service 
ethically by showing how the technological mind inverts the values of the 
moral order.
My main complaint against Ellul’s analysis is a fundamentally socio-
logical one. As so many sociologists do, Ellul juxtaposes structure with agen-
cy. Correctly, he and other sociologists tend to unmask delusions of indi-
vidual agency untouched by, un-hemmed in, unconstrained by culture and 
agency. We are less free, agile agents than we delude ourselves into imagin-
ing. If there are deep structural constraints—theologians might speak here 
of ‘structural sin’—then, the address to them must be equally structural.
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Yet, sociological structures (even quite constraining ones) are never to-
tally divorced from human agency and there is a kind of “social construc-
tion” of reality. Humans who acquiesce in structures—perhaps, because 
they feel they are constrained by them and not free—can withdraw (as hap-
pens in revolutionary moments) their consent from them and, again, basi-
cally, unmask their de-humanizing character. Nor is all agency merely in-
dividual—there exists a collective agency, a more mass reaction and horror 
toward the de-humanizing character of the modern technological mind. In 
a recent, very brilliant, book, What is a Person?, sociologist Christian Smith 
uncovers some of the mistakes of an overly robust “structuralist” sociologi-
cal model, such as found in Ellul.13
Perhaps, following Lewis Mumford, we will need to distinguish be-
tween authoritarian versus democratic techniques. Yet, even there, we may 
want to maintain a methodical suspicion about the purported claims for 
democratic techniques. The technological mind exalts freedom as an indi-
vidual sense of choice. It masks how often the range of choices (if, indeed, 
there are any) is pre-determined by the regime of technology. So, I take El-
lul’s analysis quite seriously about the kind of dilemmas inherent in our 
technological society and within our minds. Although, I assume his work 
would read differently if his sociology were more informed by those who 
juxtapose structure and agency and know that there are elements of human 
agency (e.g., acceptance, acquiescence, willful cooperation) in every social 
structure. Had I read The Technological Society in the late 1960’s, I might have 
missed this point. However, once I read Anthony Giddens’ book, The Con-
stitution of Society: Outline for the Theory of Structuration, I could no longer 
accept Ellul’s crass view of sociological structures.14 Having said that, how-
ever, I still think anyone who reads The Technological Society will be much 
more prone to engage in a truly “re"ective” (carefully, suspiciously, and cau-
tiously re"ective!) practice.
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Close to Home and All Together Very Different 
People often ask whether you can begin to have the intimacy in the 
online class when you are not together in person. The format we use 
allows everyone to see and hear each other simultaneously. Offering 
the !eld education re"ection seminar online has allowed students to 
sign on from a convenient location and enter into dialogue with each 
other. We bring rich diversity of experience and socio-geographic lo-
cation to the process. We are in cities connected by high-speed !ber-
optic cable, and in remote rural locations connected by satellite; we 
are in fancy of!ces, and small closets at the homeless shelter. Even 
more, the seminar members are connecting from various sites—their 
of!ces, their homes, a hotel on the road. We see their lives as they are 
unfolding. We meet their children, partners, dogs, and, !nally, this 
semester, we even met an elusive cat. We become close in a way that 
lets us enter more deeply into the narrative of the cases presented and 
that lets us understand the seminar members more fully in context.
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